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This article puts the judgment of the EC Court of First Instance (CFI) in Microsoft in 
perspective and links it with the ongoing discussion on competition policy and 
innovation. It also replies to some claims made by Ahlborn and Evans in their piece on 
the same judgment (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1115867). The 
first section takes a general look at the judgment, and in particular at how the CFI issued 
a judgment from which it would be difficult to appeal. It also addresses the allegedly 
excessive deference of the CFI towards the Commission decision (1). Afterwards, the 
paper goes into more specific issues concerning the first part on interoperability 
information (2) and the second part on tying (3). Finally, the judgment is placed in a 
broader forward-looking perspective (4).
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The judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of the European Communities in 
Microsoft v. Commission
1 led to the closing of this 10-year mammoth case.
2 Its sheer size 
immediately begs the question of whether there are any conclusions, guidance or lessons 
transcending this complex story. 
 
This article seeks to answer this question, if only in part. It complements and comments 
upon the companion piece of Ahlborn and Evans, who address the same question.
3 It 
shows that, while the broad criticism levelled by Ahlborn and Evans might be unjustified, 
there are a number of more specific points where the CFI opens more issues than it solves 
with its judgment, in particular as regards the relationship between competition policy 
and innovation. 
 
The first section takes a general look at the judgment, and in particular at how the CFI 
issued a judgment from which it would be difficult to appeal.
4 It also addresses the 
allegedly excessive deference of the CFI towards the Commission decision (1). 
Afterwards, the paper goes into more specific issues concerning the first part on 
interoperability information (2) and the second part on tying (3). Finally, the judgment is 
placed in a broader forward-looking perspective (4).  
 
1.  The CFI between the Commission and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
 
Institutionally, the CFI finds itself between the Commission and the ECJ. In its judgment 
it sought to fulfil its review function with respect to the Commission (1.2.) while 
avoiding exposing itself to criticism from the ECJ on an eventual appeal (1.1.).  
 
1.1.  The eventual appeal to the ECJ 
 
The CFI judgment in Microsoft appears to be designed to avoid any exposure to a 
reprimand by the ECJ, by minimizing the chances of appeal.
5 The CFI seems to keep 
itself busy with facts for the larger part of the opinion, or at least to want the reader to 
perceive the case as a large mass of factual issues thrust upon a relatively simple and 
straightforward legal framework. Those parts of the judgment which are explicitly 
                                                 
1 CFI, 17 September 2007, Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Commission, not yet reported [hereinafter referred 
to as the “Judgment”]. This case was brought under Article 230 EC against Commission Decision 2007/53 
of 24 March 2004, Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft [2007] OJ L 32/23 (summary), available in full text 
at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/index_en.html [hereinafter referred to as the “Decision”]. In 
addition, this article also refers to the Order of the President of the Court of First Instance of 22 December 
2004, Case T-201/04 R, Microsoft v. Commission [2004] ECR II-4463, dismissing Microsoft’s application 
for interim relief. 
2 With the Commission Decision of 27 February 2008, Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft, available in full 
text at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/index_en.html. The case had started with a complaint by Sun 
on 10 December 1998. 
3 C. Ahlborn and D.S. Evans, “The Microsoft judgment and its implications for the competition policy 
towards dominant firms in Europe” {add reference} [hereinafter “Ahlborn and Evans”]. 
4 And indeed Microsoft chose not to appeal from the CFI judgment to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
5 As illustrated by ECJ, 15 February 2005, Case C-12/03 P, Commission v. Tetra Laval [2005] ECR I-987, 
it matters not that the appeal appears unlikely to succeed, since the ECJ can also mark its disagreement with 
the reasoning of the CFI without necessarily coming to a different conclusion.   3 
presented as issues of law are apparently devoid of any innovation which could trigger 
further discussion. 
 
So it is with the first part on the supply of interoperability information. The Commission 
case hinges upon the line of case-law concerning refusal to supply, starting with 
Commercial Solvents,
6 and including – or morphing into – the so-called Essential 
Facilities Doctrine (EFD), which although never recognized by name is said to be 
exemplified by a string of major cases, namely Magill,
7 Bronner
8 and IMS.
9 A key 
element in the latter cases in particular are those conditions or “exceptional 
circumstances”
10 under which Article 82 EC could trump property rights – over physical 
or intellectual property – to support an order forcing the holder of such rights to grant 
access to competitors. Over the years, the ECJ seemed to converge towards a specific list 
of conditions.
11 In its decision, the Commission was short on the law and surprisingly 
audacious, staking its entire case on the claim that “there is no persuasiveness to an 
approach that would advocate the existence of an exhaustive checklist of exceptional 
circumstances and would have the Commission disregard a limine other circumstances of 
exceptional character that may deserve to be taken into account when assessing a refusal 
to supply.”
12 In its judgment, the CFI carefully avoids the issue, finding that it “follows 
from... case-law that the following circumstances, in particular, must be considered to be 
exceptional [emphasis added]”.
13 The CFI then proceeds to restate those conditions, in a 
way which carefully follows existing ECJ case-law.
14 The rest of the judgment on the 
first issue, for all its length, professes to do nothing more than review whether the 
Commission made out those circumstances on the facts of Microsoft. The CFI thereby 
avoids ruling on the Commission argument about the exhaustiveness of the list drawn 
from ECJ case-law.  
 
On the second part regarding tying, the CFI went further: not only did it put the case 
against Microsoft on fairly safe legal terrain, but it actually supplied the legal reasoning 
which was missing from the Commission decision. If the legal reasoning of the 
Commission under the first part was audacious, it was skimpy at best under the second 
one. The Commission pulled out its four conditions for tying to be prohibited under 
Article 82 EC like a rabbit out of a hat, with no references whatsoever to support its 
                                                 
6 ECJ, March 1974, Cases 6 and 7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.p.A. v. Commission [1974] ECR 
223. 
7 ECJ, 6 April 1995, Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) v. Commission [1995] 
ECR I-743. 
8 ECJ, 26 November 1998, Case C-7/97, Bronner [1998] ECR I-7791. 
9 ECJ, 29 April 2004, Case C-418/01, IMS Health [2004] ECR I-5039. 
10 In their case-law, the ECJ and CFI characterize as “exceptional circumstances” the conditions required to 
jutisfy ordering a dominant firms to provide access to its physical or intellectual property. For the sake of 
simplicity in drafting, they are referred to here as “conditions”. 
11 In IMS, supra, note 9, while the ECJ did specify that the conditions were cumulative, it did not rule that 
the list was exhaustive. That case was in any event decided after the Commission decision in Microsoft. 
12 Decision at para. 555. 
13 Judgment at para. 332. 
14 Ibid., with the addition of the absence of objective justification at para. 333, the note that the new product 
condition is found only in intellectual property cases at para. 334 and the two-market construction at para. 
335.   4 
assertion.
15 In particular, the Commission did not explain how these conditions related to 
the two leading cases on tying until then, Hilti
16 and Tetra Pak.
17 The CFI obliged and 
constructed the legal reasoning which the Commission should have included in its 
Decision,
18 thereby also positioning the Decision as a mere application of conditions 
which had already been outlined in – or at least could be derived from – previous cases. 
 
In the end, the CFI judgment is made to appear light on law and heavy on fact. What is 
more, the legal discussion is short and seems uncontroversial. In the light of the limited 
scope of appeals to the ECJ (on points of law only), this reduced greatly the basis for an 
appeal from that judgment (and the chances that it could be successful). Unfortunately, 
this also means that the more interesting points in the judgment are hidden – sometimes 
deep – in what appear to be discussions of fact. The CFI judgment does indeed feature a 
number of remarkable passages, some of which are picked up in the next sections.  
 
1.2.  The review of the Commission Decision 
 
Ahlborn and Evans argue that the CFI was too deferential to the Commission. They claim 
that this deferential attitude is typical of Article 82 EC cases, and that it is potentially 
dangerous in that it leaves the Commission (and NCAs and national courts acting as 
original instances) with too much discretion in the application of Article 82 EC. 
 
Yet in Microsoft, the CFI extends the “more attentive” approach introduced in Merger 
Control Regulation (MCR) cases
19 to Article 82 EC cases. The CFI adopts the standard 
set out by the ECJ in Tetra Laval: “The Community Courts must not only establish 
whether the evidence put forward is factually accurate, reliable and consistent but must 
also determine whether that evidence contains all the relevant data that must be taken into 
consideration in appraising a complex situation and whether it is capable of substantiating 
the conclusions drawn from it.”
20 As a matter of principle, Microsoft actually heralds 
closer scrutiny of Commission decisions.  
 
Ahlborn and Evans note that the CFI also recalls the general proposition that the Court 
will only undertake a limited review of complex economic or technical appraisals made 
by the Commission under competition law.
21 While this may seem to send a “mixed 
message”, as the two authors claim, it is important to keep in mind the nature of the 
proceedings: the CFI does not conduct an appeal de novo, and accordingly it will not 
                                                 
15 Decision at para. 794. While the Commission does not indicate where these four conditions are coming 
from, they are remarkably close to the requirements under US law for tying to be illegal under § 1 of the 
Sherman Act, as they were applied in the US Microsoft case: see US v. Microsoft 253 F.3d 34 at 84 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001), taking into account that the DC Court of Appeal added a foreclosure of competition requirement 
and an efficiency defence when it moved the inquiry under a rule of reason at 95 and ff. 
16 CFI, 12 December 1991, Case T-30/89, Hilti AG v. Commission [1991] ECR II-1439, upheld by ECJ, 2 
March 1994, Case C-53/92, Hilti AG v. Commission [1994] ECR I-667. 
17 CFI, 6 October 1994, Case T-83/91, Tetra Pak International v. Commission [1994] ECR II-755, upheld 
by ECJ, 14 November 1996, Case C-333/94. Tetra Pak International v. Commission [1996] ECR I-5951. 
18 Judgment at para. 852-869. 
19 As formulated authoritatively by the ECJ in Tetra Laval, supra, note 5, para. 39. 
20 Judgment at para. 89. 
21 Ibid., para. 87 and 88.   5 
reach its own conclusions on what the “correct” legal assessment was. The CFI is 
conducting judicial review of a Commission decision in area where the Commission 
enjoys a measure of discretion, and accordingly the key issue is whether the Commission 
reached the conclusion it did without manifest errors. 
 
More fundamentally, the degree of deference granted to Commission decisions cannot be 
measured simply by looking at the success rate of challenges to various types of 
Commission decisions before the Community courts, as Ahlborn and Evans do. This 
approach is methodologically flawed for two reasons. Firstly, the dataset is not 
necessarily representative, comparing as it does cases brought before the ECJ/CFI against 
MCR or Article 82 decisions. On the one hand, MCR decisions are typically not brought 
to the CFI unless there is a major concern with the decision. It is well known that despite 
the efforts of the CFI, firms cannot afford to wait for the outcome of a challenge to a 
Commission decision. Hence positive decisions with commitments on the part of the 
notifying parties are rarely challenged by the parties, even if the Commission might have 
made errors in its assessment.
22 Typically the most controversial negative decisions end 
up before the CFI.
23 Given the disincentive to litigate it should come as no surprise that 
when the parties do bring their case to the CFI, they achieve a significant success rate. On 
the other hand, there is almost no disincentive to challenge negative Article 82 EC 
decisions, and a larger proportion of them are brought before the Courts. A very rough 
look at the figures shows that the proportion of reversals to total negative decisions is not 
so different, at 25% for MCR cases versus 18% for Article 82 cases.
24 
 
Cases  MCR  Article 82 
Negative decisions by the Commission  20  50 
Brought before the Community courts  9  28 
Commission decision reversed  5
25  9 
% of reversals to total negative decisions  25  18 
 
Secondly and more fundamentally, deference is not related to the rate at which the CFI 
and ECJ reverse or confirm Commission decisions. This would imply that the Court is 
                                                 
22 Positive (clearance) decisions have in a number of cases been challenged by disgruntled competitors of 
the merged entity, with limited success: see CFI, 3 April 2003, Case T-114/02, BaByliss v. Commission 
[2003] ECR II-1279 and CFI, 13 July 2006, Case T-464/04, Impala v. Commission [2006] ECR II-2289. 
They are left out of the dataset since they do not correspond to the concern for Type I errors which 
underpins the discussion of deference. If they were included, in any event, the reversal percentage for MCR 
decisions would only be decreased. 
23 And even then only to make the point, as was the case with GE/Honeywell. The award of damages 
against the Community in CFI, 11 July 2007, Case T-351/03, Schneider/Legrand (not yet reported), 
however, changes the incentives and could lead to more systematic challenges to MCR decisions.  
24 As of January 2008. The total number of negative decisions under Article 82 EC is based on published 
cases. Nowadays cases tend to be systematically published, but in the early days of EC competition law 
some cases went unpublished. The real number of negative Article 82 EC decisions is therefore probably 
higher, so that the proportion should in fact be somewhat lower, given that none of the unpublished cases 
were brought to the ECJ or CFI (otherwise they would have been taken into the data set by virtue of the 
ECJ/CFI judgment). 
25 Counting CFI, 14 December 2005, Case T-210/01, General Electric v. Commission [2005] ECR II-5575 
as a reversal in substance, if not in result.   6 
deferent whenever it fails to quash a Commission decision. However, it is quite possible 
that the Court, having submitted the Commission decision to thorough scrutiny, would 
still conclude that the Commission did its work properly and that its decision should 
stand. In other words, the Court can both leave deference at the door and yet ultimately 
side with the Commission.
26 
 
If anything, Microsoft marks a new era in Article 82 EC litigation. Never before had the 
Commission put so much effort and care into a decision, and never before had the CFI 
looked into every nook and cranny of an Article 82 EC decision the way it did in its 
judgment. Without wanting to launch a discussion on litigation strategy, the reasons for 
judgment filed by the CFI show that the Court had to deal with a large number of 
arguments thrown at it by Microsoft; some were dismissed summarily as “merely 
semantic”
27 or “purely formal”
28 but the others were considered carefully, as the reasons 
for judgment show. Save for the management trustee, Microsoft simply failed to convince 
the CFI that the Commission had made a manifest error in its Decision. But the CFI left 
no stone unturned. 
 
The CFI judgment might appear deferential in the light of the earlier Order of the 
President of the CFI on Microsoft’s application for interim measures (suspension of the 
Commission Decision pending review).
29 Indeed that Order had gone against Microsoft, 
but not for the usual reasons. According to the case-law of the ECJ, interim measures can 
be granted if the entrant shows (i) a prima facie case on the substance and (ii) urgency, 
i.e. that the balance of inconvenience weighs in favour of the entrant.
30 Typically, when 
applications for interim measures are turned down, the order turns on the prima facie case 
(first condition). The Order in Microsoft was a rare instance where the entrant was found 
to have made a prima facie case; the application was rejected on urgency. In his Order, 
the President of the CFI indicated that he thought that Microsoft had valid arguments 
against the Commission Decision on both the interoperability information
31 and the 
tying
32 issues. Yet none of these arguments carried the day in the actual judgment three 
years later. The President might have been outvoted in the Grand Chamber.
33 At the same 
                                                 
26 From a lawyer’s perspective, the conflation of the outcome (confirm or quash) with the process 
(deferential or not) reflects a typical failure of social science research to take judicial processes seriously, 
focusing instead of outcomes and extraneous factors. 
27 Judgment at para. 850. 
28 Ibid. at para. 773. 
29 Order of 22 December 2004, supra, note 1. This is an order on an application by Microsoft for the 
suspension of the execution of the Commission Decision of March 2004. 
30 Ibid., para. 71, referring to the Rules of Procedure of the Court and to case-law. 
31 Ibid., para. 204 and ff. These prima facie valid arguments related among others to whether the Decision 
fit the set of conditions in the case-law and whether the presence of intellectual property rights made any 
difference in the outcome, two issues which of course feature prominently in the CFI judgment. 
32 Ibid., para. 394 and ff. These prima facie valid arguments related among others to the test used by the 
Commission to find an abusive tying, to the significance of the integrated Windows design in the legal 
assessment and to the existence of separate markets for Windows OS and Media Player, here as well issues 
which feature prominently in the CFI judgment. 
33 As Ahlborn and Evans seem to suggest at p. {27}.   7 
time, it cannot be excluded either that, upon closer examination, the CFI found that the 
Commission Decision should stand.
34  
 
2.  Refusal to supply interoperability information 
 
As indicated above, on the first issue – the refusal by Microsoft to supply interoperability 
information to its competitors, such as Sun and Novell – the CFI does not really engage 
with the adventurous legal position staked by the Commission in the Decision. Rather, 
the CFI proceeds to show how Microsoft fits within the set of conditions so far identified 
in the case-law (up to and including IMS, hereinafter the “IMS test”), while leaving open 
the issue whether other conditions might also be relevant in deciding whether to order 
access to the intellectual property held by a dominant firm. While the CFI might not have 
gone as far as to indulge into substitution de motifs – replacing the Commission reasoning 
with its own, which it cannot do under Article 230 EC
35 – it nevertheless seriously 
reshuffles the Commission findings and reasoning to recast them within the IMS test. 
When the Commission decided Microsoft in 2004, IMS had not yet been issued, and to a 
certain extent the Commission might be excused for not having followed a judgment 
which had not yet been pronounced. At the same time, IMS merely restated and 
confirmed the limitative set of conditions which had already been set out in earlier 
judgments such as Magill and Bronner. In 2004, the Commission chose to advocate a less 
restrictive approach, relying on an open-ended set of conditions, including in particular 
the fact the Microsoft had engaged in a repeated pattern of conduct and had disrupted 
previous levels of supply.
36 Obviously, if the Commission took this position, by 
implication it was not quite convinced that its case fulfilled the IMS test.
37 Yet the CFI 
finds that Microsoft is in line with that test. As can be expected, the weaknesses which 
prompted the Commission to advocate a broader set of conditions do surface when the 
CFI tries to show that the IMS test is met. Each condition is now reviewed in turn. 
                                                 
34 See also A. Bartosch, “Der Zugang zu einer wesentlichen Einrichtung – eine Zwischenbilanz nach dem 
Beschluss des EuG-Präsidenten vom 22.12.2004 in der Rechtssache Microsoft” (2005) 51 RIW 241. 
35 ECJ, 27 January 2000, Case C-164/98 P, DIR International Film v. Commission [2000] ECR I-447 at 
para. 38 and ff. 
36 It is open to argument whether the Commission might not have been wiser to rely on the “classical” 
refusal to supply case-law, as exemplified by Commercial Solvents, supra, note 6, instead of the more 
recent “essential facilities” line of cases. For a comparison between the two, see P. Larouche, Competition 
Law and Regulation in European Telecommunications (Oxford: Hart, 2000) at 203-211. Commercial 
Solvents involved the disruption of earlier levels of supply and set a much lower threshold for abuse than 
the “essential facilities” cases where dominant firms were forced to open up access where it had never been 
granted before. Two reasons might explain why the Commission took the legal position it did in Microsoft: 
(i) the prevalence within the Commission staff of the unified theory of refusal to supply and essential 
facilities, according to which the whole case-law is part of a coherent whole (as put forward by J. Temple 
Lang, “Defining Legitimate Competition: Companies’ Duties to Supply Competitors and Access to 
Essential Facilities” (1994) 18 Fordham LJ 437) and (ii) the worry that Commercial Solvents, an older case 
which smacks of protecting competitors rather than competition, would not survive under contemporary 
standards for competition law. See also D. Geradin “Limiting the scope of Article 82 EC: What can the EU 
learn from the U.S. Supreme Court’s judgment in Trinko in the wake of Microsoft, IMS and Deutsche 
Telekom?” (2004) 41 CMLRev 1519 at 1535-1536. 
37 For a discussion of how the Commission Decision diverges from the IMS test, see R. Pardolesi and A.  
Renda, “The European Commission’s case against Microsoft: Kill Bill?” (2004) 27 World Comp 513 at 
549-551 and J. Killick, “IMS and Microsoft Judged in the Cold Light of IMS” (2004) 1:2 Comp L Rev.   8 
 
2.1.  Indispensability of the property to which access is sought 
 
As for indispensability, the CFI downplays a key issue, namely the degree of 
interoperability which a dominant firm is bound to provide to its competitors. That issue 
is dealt with early in the judgment, almost as a preliminary matter.
38 In its argument 
before both Commission and CFI, Microsoft relied heavily on the definition of 
interoperability given at Directive 91/250.
39 Echoing the Commission, the CFI finds no 
inconsistency between the degree of interoperability required in the Decision and the 
definition of Directive 91/250, and holds in any event that the Directive was ultimately 
irrelevant when it came to interpreting Article 82 EC.
40 Yet the arguments focus on the 
wording of the Directive and fail to address squarely the main point, namely the extent of 
the special responsibility of a dominant firm. 
 
As a starting point, in the computer network of a typical business, a large number of 
servers interact with the client computers and with each other in what is termed a 
“domain architecture”. In a nutshell, Microsoft’s view was that it was sufficient if rival 
workgroup server operating systems (OS) were able to interoperate with Windows clients 
(so-called client/server interoperability). In such a case, Microsoft and its rivals would 
essentially have competed for the whole of the domain architecture, i.e. for all the servers 
of a given business (or at least all of its workgroup servers). This could be equated with 
“competition for the market” of each individual business customer,
41 a fairly granular 
form of competition. 
 
In contrast, the Commission expected Microsoft to ensure what it termed 
“interoperability with the Windows domain architecture”,
42 meaning that it should be 
possible to run rival workgroup server OS on one workgroup server within a larger 
Windows domain. In that case, business customers can mesh Windows and rival servers 
within their domain, and accordingly every single server is open to competition. This 
could be compared with “competition in the market”. Of course, the required degree of 
interoperability is then much higher: not only must rival workgroup server OS 
interoperate with Windows clients, they must also be interoperable with the Windows 
servers found within the rest of the Windows domain.  
 
Both the Commission and the CFI simply assume that the latter option – competition in 
the market – is preferrable. The CFI endorses the Commission view that the higher 
degree of interoperability bound with this option “was necessary in order to enable 
                                                 
38 Judgment at para. 207-245, followed by the discussion of whether the remedy actually matches the 
substantive analysis of the Commission at para. 246-266. 
39 Directive 91/250 of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs [1991] OJ L 122/42, Rec. 
10-12 and Art. 6. 
40 Judgment at para. 222-227. 
41 Which could be administered through either public procurement mechanisms (for public sector 
institutions) or private mechanisms such as bids made on the basis of RFPs. 
42 Decision at para. 176-184.   9 




As economic literature shows, however, the choice between competition for and in the 
market is not so simple.
 44 Among others, it involves trade-offs between various models 
of innovation. Crisply put, competition for the market might provide stronger incentives 
for breakthrough innovation, since the whole market is at stake, but it is likely to give the 
market leader a strong – usually dominant – position. This dominant position is then the 
prize which competitors want to take away from the market leader in the next period, 
when further breakthrough innovation reshuffles the market. In contrast, competition in 
the market places firms are under constant pressure to operate as efficiently as possible 
and to innovate, even if only incrementally, in order to gain an advantage over 
competitors within a largely common technological environment. However, the 
incentives to come up with a massive breakthrough innovation could be reduced, in the 
absence of the prospect of large innovation rents for the market leader. 
 
In Microsoft, regrettably, neither the Commission nor the CFI went squarely into the 
basic issue of why competition in the market and incremental innovation should be 
preferred to competition for the market and breakthrough innovation. At most, there are 
oblique references when the CFI answers Microsoft’s argument that the degree of 
interoperability required by the Commission was erroneous.
45 The CFI seems to consider 
that, because of Microsoft’s ‘superdominance’
46 on client OS, the Windows domain 
architecture has become the de facto standard for workgroup servers, as confirmed in the 
evidence gathered by the Commission (in particular market surveys). On that basis, and 
without further discussion of the competition policy implications, the CFI confirms the 
Commission conclusion that interoperability within the Windows domain architecture is 
indispensable.  
 
Once the degree of interoperability required by the Commission is agreed to, the rest of 
the reasoning concerning indispensability follows.
 47  
 
2.2.  Elimination of competition on the downstream market 
 
The next condition in the IMS test is that the refusal to disclose the information would 
eliminate competition on the relevant downstream market. The CFI confirms the relevant 
                                                 
43 Judgment at para. 228. 
44 On this point, see the extensive discussion in Pardolesi and Renda, supra, note 37 at 524 and ff. Note 
furthermore that the two are not exclusive of one another: breakthrough innovation can also occur on a 
market which is otherwise characterized by incremental innovation. 
45 Under the “indispensability” heading of the Judgment at para. 371-422.  
46 The CFI does not use the term ‘superdominance’, referring instead to the ‘extraordinary’ nature of 
Microsoft’s dominance. 
47 Contrary to what Ahlborn and Evans claim at {9}, the requirements of indispensability and elimination 
of competition are not one and the same thing, even if the difference between the two is slight: 
indispensability refers to whether the facility/information can be duplicated or otherwise replaced (where 
the threshold for what is economically feasible is set quite high, see Bronner, supra, note 8), whereas the 
‘elimination of competition’ condition is more economic and involves relevant market definition. See 
Larouche, supra, note 36 at 188-196.   10 
market definition of the Commission and the methods used for the assessment of market 
shares.
48 It is interesting to note that the CFI finds that, in any event, the case of the 
Commission does not rest on the correct assessment of the market for workgroup server 
OS, since the theory of harm put forward by the Commission involves leveraging of 
Microsoft’s uncontested dominance on the client OS market over to the workgroup server 
OS market.
49 The Commission case is then subjected to a reality test where the CFI 
reviews the actual determination that the refusal to supply the interoperability 
information is likely to eliminate competition on the relevant market. The main difficulty 
is that, despite Microsoft’s increasing market share, a number of competitors have 
managed to remain active on the market, and Linux providers emerged as new 
competitors during the term covered by the inquiry. In theory, it is conceivable that such 
a competitive fringe would suffice to keep the market competitive. However, the CFI 
agrees with the assessment of the Commission, which was relatively well evidenced. 
 
2.3.  Hindrance to the emergence of a new product  
 
The tensions caused by the reshuffling undertaken by the CFI to fit the case within the 
IMS test are most visible when it comes to the condition that the refusal to supply 
information must prevent the emergence of a new product for which there is demand. 
That circumstance was developed at the greatest length in IMS,
50 which was rendered 
after the Microsoft decision. In IMS, as in Magill
51 where the new product circumstance 
was introduced, the facts were reasonably clear: Magill was seeking to bring to the 
market a new type of TV guide, whereas NDC (the applicant in IMS) seemed to want to 
replicate IMS’ product. Here the case can be construed in many ways: the Commission 
chose to emphasize the disruption of existing supply relationships with the introduction 
of Windows 2000,
52 so that competitors were prevented from continuing to offer 
competing products with innovative features, by way of “follow-on innovation”.
53 This 
might suffice under the general Commission approach whereby the list of conditions is 
not limited to the IMS test: the case would then come closer to the more classical case-
law such as Commercial Solvents (refusal to supply whereby existing dealings are 
terminated). The CFI, on the other hand, chose to frame Microsoft within the IMS test, 
with its seemingly more exacting “new product” criterion.  
 
The answer of the CFI is to follow the line of reasoning of the Commission, namely to go 
back to the text of Article 82(b) EC, which presents “limiting production, markets or 
technical development to the prejudice of consumers” as a type of abuse of a dominant 
position. The CFI then links the new product condition to the wording of Article 82(b) 
EC, holding that the “appearance of a new product cannot be the only parameter... 
prejudice may arise where there is a limitation not only of production or markets, but also 
                                                 
48 For a criticism of market definition, see Pardolesi and Renda, supra, note 37 at 543-547.  
49 Judgment at para. 559. Leveraging claims being complicated and controversial in economic theory, one 
would have expected the CFI to spend more time on this point. 
50 Supra, note 9. 
51 Supra, note 7. 
52 Decision at para. 578-584. 
53 Ibid. at para. 693-700.   11 
of technical development”.
54 Leaving aside the limited probative value of the illustrative 
list of Article 82 EC,
55 the CFI is at pains to reconcile this conclusion with IMS, where 
Article 82(b) played no role in the reasoning and the ECJ insisted on the need to show 
that the applicant “intends to produce new goods or services not offered by the owner of 
the right and for which there is a potential consumer demand”.
56 Thereafter, the CFI finds 
that the Commission committed no manifest error in its Decision. In essence, once they 
obtain the interoperability information from Microsoft, competitors have an incentive to 
introduce workgroup server OS which are differentiated from and provide added value 
over Windows workgroup server OS.
57 Here as well, much as on the indispensability 
issue, the Commission and the CFI assume that incremental innovation – such as would 
typically result from a “competition in the market” or cumulative knowledge model – is 
at least as valuable as the lumpier breakthrough innovation which would occur under a 
model of “competition for the market” or non-cumulative knowledge. This assumption is 
not explicitly discussed anywhere in the Decision or the CFI judgment. 
 
Much has been written already and will still be written on how the CFI stretched the new 
product circumstance in Microsoft.
58 At the same time, as will be seen below, the CFI 
might have made its life unduly complicated by taking too formalistic a view of what a 
“new product” should be and entering into a discussion of how technical improvements 
in product features were also valuable. Nowhere is it written that a “new product” needs 
to be a completely new offering, entirely distinct from the original one.
59 At first sight, if 
as set out above it is assumed that smaller-scale incremental innovation is valuable, there 
is no compelling legal reason why competing workgroup server OS, if they offer 
innovative features, cannot qualify as new products. The real difficulty is not with the 




2.4.  Absence of objective justification 
 
                                                 
54 Judgment at para. 647. 
55 As the CFI itself recalls later in its Judgment when dealing with the tying issue, at para. 859-861. 
56 IMS, supra, note 9 at para. 49. 
57 It is interesting to note that the reasoning of the CFI is replete with references to the manner in which 
other providers competed with Microsoft over previous versions on Windows, underlining how the case is 
easier to frame as a termination of existing supply relationships, as discussed above. 
58 See already Ahlborn and Evans at {11}, referring to C. Ahlborn et al, “The logic and limits of the 
‘exceptional circumstances’ in Magill and IMS Health” (2005) 28 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1109. See also D. 
Ridyard, “Compulsory access under EC competition law – A new doctrine of ‘convenient facilities’ and the 
case for price regulation” [2004] ECLR 669. 
59 See the interesting discussion in Ahlborn at al., ibid. at 1147 on this point. Their conclusion is entirely 
apposite: a new product “satisfies potential demand by meeting the needs of consumers in ways that 
existing products do not”. Not even in Magill, supra, note 7 was it the case: after all, the Magill TV guide 
contained the exact same schedules (the essential information) as the others, its main novelty consisting in 
bringing all these schedules in one single guide. 
60 See also F. Lévêque, “Innovation, Leveraging and Essential Facilities: Interoperability Licensing in the 
EU Microsoft Case” (2005) 28 World Comp 71 at 75 and ff.   12 
Finally, the CFI leaves the door open for Microsoft to prove that its refusal to disclose the 
interoperability information is objectively justified.
61 Before the Commission and the CFI, 
Microsoft’s argument rested on the adverse incentives on innovation which would follow 
from compulsory disclosure of interoperability information.
62 The CFI dismissed the 
argument as “vague, general and theoretical”,
63 repeating its earlier finding that the 
remedy did not allow cloning of Microsoft products and – interestingly enough – 
referring once more to Microsoft’s disclosure policy on earlier versions of Windows, 
which apparently did not affect the innovation incentives.
64 
 
More fundamentally, Microsoft shows the shortcomings of the efficiency defence as 
envisaged in the 2005 Discussion Paper.
65 
 
First of all, the very “efficiency” which is at stake in Microsoft is not so much an 
efficiency gain which would result directly from a given course of conduct,
66 but rather a 
concern for the long-term, dynamic implications of the competitive analysis.
67 As such, it 
is not so much an ‘efficiency defence’ as a component of a proper competitive analysis. 
It cannot easily be dealt with at the tail-end of the inquiry, after the main elements of 
Article 82 EC – dominance and abuse – have been established, as the Commission 
proposed in its 2005 Discussion Paper.
68 In Microsoft, the Commission had difficulties 
holding to this artificial separation between the abuse and the efficiency defence. At the 
end, it did frame its conclusions in terms of balancing: “on balance, the possible negative 
impact of an order to supply on Microsoft’s incentives to innovate is outweighed by [the] 
positive impact [of the disclosure] on the level of innovation of the whole industry”.
69 
Microsoft seized the opportunity to argue that the Commission was introducing a new 
test for the application of Article 82 EC, in violation of previous ECJ case-law.
70 The CFI 
                                                 
61 On the availability of the defence and the burden of proof, the CFI follows the position set out DG 
Competition in its Discussion Paper on the application of Article 82 EC to exclusionary abuses (December 
2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf, at para. 77 and 
ff. On that issue, the Discussion Paper builds on existing case-law. 
62 To the extent that, as pictured by the Judgment at para. 689-695, Microsoft would invoke the mere 
existence of intellectual property rights over the interoperability information as an objective justification in 
and of itself, the argument would be circular, as the CFI notes. However, Microsoft’s argument went 
further and considered also the ex ante effect of forced disclosure on its incentives to innovate in general. 
63 Ibid. at 698. 
64 Ibid. at 700, 702. 
65 See also E. Rousseva, “The Concept of ‘Objective Justification’ of an Abuse of a Dominant Position: 
Can It help to Modernise the Analysis under Article 82 EC?” (2006) 2:2 Comp L Rev. 
66 Compare for instance with the efficiencies arising from certain types of vertical restraints in terms of 
avoiding free-riding and overcoming information asymmetries. 
67 The whole argument centres on incentives to innovate, so that even at the theoretical level (leaving aside 
the quantification problem), there might never be any efficiency gain, given that innovation is 
unpredictable. It is all about trying to influence the course of future events in a matter which is thought 
favourable. In the Discussion Paper, supra, note 61 at para. 234-236, the Commission classifies this 
argument as a defence, without really addressing the issue raised here. 
68 See Dicussion Paper, supra, note 61 at para. 77 and ff. 
69 Decision at para. 783. 
70 In principle, this argument appears to run against the interest of Microsoft, given that a balancing test 
would likely do better justice to its arguments on innovation incentives. However, in the context of the 
review of an existing Commission decision, any legal argument which would lead to the invalidity of the 
decision was presumably thought to be worth making.   13 
considered the above passage as a mere slip of the pen by the Commission,
71 yet the CFI 
is equally at pains to explain how the innovation incentives can be dealt with as a 
defence, separately from the assessment of the impact of the course of conduct on the 
market carried out to establish the abuse. Its reasoning on this point is at best contrived. 
 
Operationally, putting the efficiency defence at the tail-end of the analysis places the 
defendant before a formidable task, as Microsoft shows. Once the Commission is 
satisfied that the defendant holds a dominant position and that its conduct constituted an 
abuse, i.e. produced anti-competitive effects to the detriment of consumers, it is difficult 
to see how a defendant could turn the tide by arguing that in the end the course of 
conduct does create efficiencies which actually benefit consumers. The CFI unwittingly 
illustrates this point by stating that the Commission had to “consider whether the 
justification put forward [...], on the basis of the alleged impact on its incentives to 
innovate, might prevail over [the] exceptional circumstances [of the IMS test], including 
the circumstance that the refusal at issue limited technical development to the prejudice 
of consumers”.
72 This Herculean task is not made easier by the uncertainty concerning 
the burden of proof.
73 Admittedly, the alternative – a balancing test carried out within the 
assessment of abuse – also carries its own operational difficulties, including a greater risk 
of error due to the discretion inherent in any balancing.
74 
 
2.5.  Conclusion on the refusal to disclose interoperability information 
 
In the end, with respect to the refusal to disclose interoperability information, Microsoft 
must be seen as another step in the long struggle of EC law to find a suitable analytical 
framework to deal with refusal to supply (and more broadly with cases where longer-term 
considerations relating to dynamic efficiency and innovation). Part of that struggle 
involves ending the separate life of the infamous “essential facility doctrine” and basing 
the analysis on sound principles consistent with the rest of Article 82 EC. In Microsoft, 
the CFI shies away from the open-ended approach of the Commission, but it perhaps tries 
too hard to hold on to the orthodox IMS test. After all, the IMS test is but a set of proxies.  
 
In a perfect world with complete information, refusal to supply cases could be dealt with, 
in line with the rest of Article 82 EC, as follows.
75 Intervention should occur only if it 
brings about an increase in overall welfare. For that, in a very simple fashion, 
0 2 1 > D + D W W  
where  W D is the variation in welfare brought about by the intervention in period 1 (now) 
and 2 (in the future), when compared to the baseline scenario (no intervention). As for 
period 1, 
a C TC TV W - - D = D ) ( 1 1  
                                                 
71 Judgment at para. 705 and ff. 
72 Ibid. at para. 709. 
73 On this point, see A. Bouchagiar, “Soft-Wars: the role of the essential facilities doctrine as jus in bello” 
(2007) 8 CRNI 337. 
74 Geradin, supra, note 36 at 1539-1543. 
75 These paragraphs build on Larouche, supra, note 36 at 196-203.   14 
where TV is the total value to consumers of the service, TC the total cost of providing 
them and  a C  the cost of decision-making by the authority.
 76 TV will increase if for 
instance the intervention removes a deadweight loss or shifts the demand curve through 
the apparition of new offerings. TC depends on the costs of the two parties, the 
incumbent (defendant) and the entrant seeking access: 
e i C C TC D + D = D  
where  i C D  reflects the increased costs incurred by the incumbent to provide access 
(including the loss of economies of scale and scope, opportunity costs and the cost of 
additional facilities) and  e C D  the reduction in cost for the entrant in not having to 
duplicate or replicate the input, facility or information to which access is sought. 
 
As for period 2, it is characterized by an expectation of innovation, which changes the 
value of the service to  2 TV ,
77 so that 
) ( 2 2 TC TV E W - D = D  
That expectation of innovation is therefore equally affected by the intervention of the 
authority to compel access to facilities or information.
78 For instance, intervention will 
modify the incentives to innovate on the part of the incumbent
79 or of the entrant
80 or 
create a climate where market players wait for signals from the authority before engaging 
into innovative ventures. 
 
In real life, however, most of these values cannot be quantified. In particular,  i C D is hard 
to ascertain ahead of intervention and  2 W D is almost impossible to quantify.
81 The IMS 
test is designed to provide an approximation of the outcome of the first equation above: 
-  The indispensability condition aims to ensure that  e C D  is negative (cost savings) 
and high, so that in any event  TC D will be limited if not negative. Furthermore, if 
the cost of duplicating or replicating the facility is low, presumably the baseline 
scenario (without intervention) will involve duplication or replication on the 
entrant’s own motion, so that  0 1= DTV  and intervention is not warranted; 
-  If the refusal to supply is likely to eliminate competition on the downstream 
market because of the market power of the incumbent, then in all 
                                                 
76 This includes the cost of making a decision (i.e. determining whether access should be granted, where or 
over which information and at what cost) and enforcing it. The cost of continuing to enforce the decision in 
subsequent periods (litigation, reporting, etc.) is ignored for the sake of simplicity. 
77 It is assumed for the sake of simplicity that TC is not changed from period 1, since there is no new 
intervention. Innovation could of course also consist in decreasing costs rather than increasing valuation. 
78 The effect of the intervention of the authority can be felt not only on the relevant market, but also on 
other markets. 
79 By giving rise to an expectation that rents on future innovation will also be confiscated via compulsory 
access or disclosure orders. 
80 By giving a greater incentive to innovate in the knowledge that access to information or facilities in the 
hands of dominant players will be enforced. At the same time, small entrants must also fear that, if 
successful, their own innovation rents could be confiscated in turn. 
81 See S. Vezzoso, “The incentives balance test in the EU Microsoft case: a pro-innovation ‘economics-
based’ approach” (2006) 27 ECLR 382.   15 
likelihood 0 1> DTV . Moreover, the incentives of the entrant to innovate are 
negatively affected by the refusal to supply, so that  2 W D could be positive. 
-  The new product condition also has a double proxy function. First of all, it also 
tends to indicate that 0 1> DTV , because consumers would value a new product for 
which there is pent-up demand. Secondly, if the entrant brings out a new product 
differing from the product of the incumbent, presumably the latter’s incentive to 
innovate is not too adversely affected,
82 so that again  2 W D would tend to be 
positive. 
-  If the efficiency defence is considered separately as an objective justification and 
not as part of the elimination of competition condition, and if the arguments 
relating to incentives to innovate are part of it, then it does provide an indication 
regarding  2 W D . 
 
The above shows that the proxies included in the IMS test are neither especially precise – 
they all serve a dual function – nor exhaustive. In particular, they are weak as regards the 
approximation of 2 W D . 
 
If other proxies can be found, there is no reason not to use them if they improve the 
quality of the approximation.
83 Seen against that background, the open-ended approach of 
the Commission is quite sensible. Two other additional conditions, in particular, were 
invoked by the Commission in its Decision; as shown above, they also surfaced in 
various places in the CFI reasoning: 
-  The refusal to disclose interoperability information could be construed as a 
disruption of previous levels of disclosure in earlier versions of Windows.
84 This 
would imply that  i C D  cannot be excessive, given the previous disclosure 
practices. Furthermore, if Microsoft still managed to be innovative despite 
voluntary disclosures to competitors on the workgroup OS market, then the effect 
of disclosure on its innovation incentives cannot be so high,
85 meaning 
that 2 W D would remain positive. 
-  Microsoft holds a “superdominant” position on the neighbouring market for client 
OS,
86 although it is not superdominant on the workgroup server OS market. If the 
assumptions implicitly underlying the case stand (competition for the market, 
cumulative knowledge and incremental innovation), then superdominance will not 
vanish overnight, and therefore Microsoft would still retain significant incentives, 
despite compulsory disclosure of interoperability information to competitors. 
                                                 
82 Since the entrant expands the market and increases the innovation rent, albeit not at the same rate as if 
the incumbent itself would have supplied the new product. At the same time, the entrant can also 
undermine the incumbent’s incentives by engaging in vertical differentiation with a new product of a lower 
quality. 
83 See also P. Larouche, “The role of the market in economic regulation” (Inaugural lecture), Tilburg, 2003 
for a discussion of how Ca can serve as a proxy for Ci and W2 under certain circumstances. 
84 Decision at para. 578-584. 
85 As noted in the Judgment at para. 702. 
86 For a critical view on the relevance of super-dominance, see J. Appeldoorn, “He who spareth his rod, 
hateth his son? Microsoft, superdominance and Article 82 EC” (2005) 26 ECLR 653.   16 
Here as well, the impact of disclosure on the innovation incentives would 
therefore be limited, meaning that 2 W D would remain positive. 
 
The following table sums up the above discussion: 
Proxy for:  TV1  Ci  Ce  W2 
Indispensability  X    X   
Elimination of competition  X      X 
New product  X      X 
Efficiency defence        X 
Previous course of conduct    X    X 
Superdominance        X 
 
In sum, as long as the conditions invoked in the reasoning of the competition authority do 
contribute to approximating the decision which would be taken under perfect 
information, there is no reason to exclude them. What is more, since the reasoning of the 
Commission and the CFI implicitly rests on a coherent but untested model of innovation 
and given that assessing the impact of intervention on innovation is very difficult, the CFI 
should have recognized the usefulness of taking into account every relevant proxy in the 
legal test in order to get the best possible picture. 
 
3.  Tying 
 
Whereas in the first part of the case, the CFI reshuffled the legal reasoning of the 
Commission, in the second part concerning tying, the CFI followed the line of reasoning 
of the Commission, after having supplied it with a legal underpinning.
87 Every condition 
of the tying test is reviewed in turn.
88 
 
3.1.  Separate products  
 
On the first condition, namely that the tying product (Windows OS) and the tied product 
(WMP) are separate products, all agree that customer demand is determinative of the 
issue, but Microsoft and the Commission disagreed on the assessment of customer 
demand. For the Commission, the mere existence of some customer demand for separate 
products is sufficient to satisfy this condition. For Microsoft, customer demand for 
separate products must be significant.
89 In other words, given technical integration (the 
                                                 
87 Supra, notes 15-18 and accompanying text.  
88 On the tying part of the Commission Decision, see also M. Dolmans and T. Graf, “Analysis of Tying 
under Article 82 EC: The European Commission’s Microsoft Decision in Perspective” (2004) 27 World 
Comp 225, D.S. Evans and J. Padilla, “Tying under Article 82 EC and the Microsoft Decision: A comment 
on Dolmans and Graf” (2004) 27 World Comp 503, D. Ridyard, “Tying and bundling – Cause for 
Complaint” (2005) 26 ECLR 316 and J.Y. Art and G. v.S. McCurdy, “The European Commission’s media 
players remedy in its Microsoft decision: Compulsory code removal despite the absence of tying or 
foreclosure” (2004) 25 ECLR 694. 
89 Microsoft insisted in particular on the absence of notable separate demand for Windows OS without 
WMP, whereas the Commission (followed by the CFI in the Judgment at para. 925-933) put more emphasis 
on the existence of separate demand for streaming media players. Microsoft’s line of argument, while 
attractive, seems to collapse the separate demand issue with the remedy. It draws strength from the   17 
merging of WMP into a broad “media functionality” for Windows), it must be shown that 
customer demand for separate products is still significant, or to paraphrase Ahlborn and 
Evans,
90 that ‘choice’ is preferred to ‘convenience’.  
 
Quite possibly, both the Commission and Microsoft could be right about consumer 
demand. Amongst end-users, two classes of consumers can probably be distinguished. 
Firstly, more tech-savvy consumers want the best available media player for their 
requirements, and are able and willing to undertake whatever operations might be 
necessary (including downloading a programme, installing it and configuring Windows) 
to obtain and use that media player. These consumers prefer choice over convenience. 
Secondly, mainstream consumers have neither the skills nor the will to play with the 
software on their computer; they expect their computer system to be able to handle media 
files and will be satisfied with whichever media player or “media functionality” handles 
that task. They prefer convenience over choice. Without making an empirical claim, it is 
probably fair to venture that the former class of consumers represents a non-negligible 
minority. If that intuition is correct, then there is demand for the products separately from 
each other and the CFI rightly sided with the Commission. 
 
3.2.  Impossibility to obtain the tying product without the tied product 
 
The CFI also confirmed the conclusion of the Commission that consumers are unable to 
obtain the tying product without the tied product. As the CFI explains,
91 this can be 
construed as a reformulation of the condition found in Article 82(d) EC to the effect that 
consumers are compelled to accept ‘supplementary obligations’. Even though WMP is 
given away for free,
92 the CFI agrees with the Commission that OEMs – and their 
consumers – are compelled to take it when they install Windows on their products and 
cannot uninstall it. However, the CFI fails to properly factor in the impact of the Consent 
Decree in the US Microsoft case.
93 Among other obligations, Microsoft undertook in the 
Consent Decree to add to Windows what is now the “Set Program Access and Defaults” 
feature,
94 allowing end-users to choose directly which media player they want to use and 
effectively to short-circuit the tie between Windows OS and WMP. The CFI considered 
that the Consent Decree was not adequate, since customers remain compelled to acquire 
both products together.
95 For OEMs, indeed, it means that any competing media player 
would be installed in addition to and not instead of WMP, giving rise to additional costs 
                                                                                                                                                 
uselessness of the remedy ordered in Microsoft. Leaving the remedy aside, however, the issue is whether 
there is separate demand for each product (i.e. without tying), which could take the form of demand for a 
package where Windows and WMP are sold together but can be untied as required. As the CFI rightly 
remarks at para. 921, Microsoft’s argument could imply that complementary products cannot be separate 
products.  
90 Ahlborn and Evans at {21}. 
91 Judgment at para. 864. 
92 At least when downloaded from the Internet. Of course the development costs of WMP are covered by 
other Microsoft revenue streams. 
93 US v. Microsoft, 231 F.Supp.2d 144 (D.D.C. 2002), modified after remand, US v. Microsoft, 2006 WL 
2882808 (D.D.C. 2006). 
94 Ibid., under III.H. This feature was added via Windows XP Service Pack 1 and is found directly in the 
Start Menu. 
95 Judgment at para. 974.   18 
for configuration and for sales support.
96 From an end-user perspective, however, it is a 
matter of which default rule is chosen: the solution following from the Consent Decree 
amounts to tying by default with the possibility to break the tie, whereas the Commission 
in its assessment requires the reverse option, namely no tying by default with the 
possibility to integrate WMP into Windows if desired.  
 
3.3.  Foreclosure of competition 
 
If the Consent Decree is not construed as giving consumers the choice to avoid the tie 
between Windows OS and WMP, then at least it should have been reflected in the core of 
the analysis, namely the foreclosure of competition. The CFI here follows the 
Commission analysis, which focuses on the OEM channel. In essence, tying WMP to 
Windows OS gives WMP an “unparalleled presence”: OEMs have no incentive to present 
other bundles to their end-users, and the latter cease to use other distribution channels 
when they see WMP installed ab initio.
97 
 
While attractive in surface, the theory of harm put forward by the Commission and 
endorsed by the CFI suffers from one major weakness: it was not borne by reality. Since 
the Commission stated its case in 2001,
98 seven years have gone by and the harm has not 
materialized. As the Commission noted, Microsoft was able to build market share on the 
media player market, up to the point where it held close to 50% of the market.
99 
However, its market share has been stagnating in the last years, as iTunes established 
itself and Adobe Flash made inroads due to the popularity of YouTube. Real also 
managed to retain second place behind WMP. To the informed observer, the media 
player market seems very competitive still. 
 
It is not clear why the fears of the Commission did not materialize. On the one hand, the 
Commission might have made the wrong assumptions about the significance of the OEM 
channel, the behaviour of users or the innovativeness of the market. On the other hand, 
the Consent Decree might have removed the threat of harm by strengthening end-user 
choice and control. The remedy imposed by the Commission in Microsoft, however, had 
little effect: Windows XP N has been a commercial failure. Certainly, if the theory of 
harm of the Commission turned out to have been correct, the Commission remedy alone 
could not have prevented harm from occurring in the absence of the Consent Decree.  
 
Assuming that the intuitive two-class end-user model set out above is accurate, the tech-
savvy users will try to avoid the tie and will look for the best media player(s) available.
100 
For these users, media players compete on performance. Conversely, the mainstream 
users will stick with WMP for the sake of convenience, but they are certainly not 
impervious to performance. They are making a trade-off: more convenience in return for 
                                                 
96 Decision at para. 851-852. 
97 Judgment at 1038-1058. 
98 With its second statement of objections, issued on 30 August 2001: Decision at para. 5. 
99 The figures here come from K.J. O’Brien, “As Europe Debated, Microsoft Took Market Share” New 
York Times (17 September 2007). See also Decision at para. 905 ff. 
100 The tying of WMP to Windows OS does not prevent other media players from being used, it just makes 
WMP more ubiquitous, as the CFI notes in the Judgment at para. 1049.    19 
less choice. Should WMP be a significantly worse product than its competitors, however, 
the cost savings in not having to bother with shopping around for a media player would 
be defeated by the loss of utility in using a sub-standard product. Presumably, 
mainstream users could then be convinced to take the steps to move to a competing 
media player. Mainstream users can be kept informed on quality by freeriding on the 
experience of tech-savvy users, which is relayed to them via media outlets. As long as the 
tech-savvy user segment is competitive, therefore, Microsoft is under pressure to keep 
WMP close to the best-of-breed, in order to avoid that the mainstream users would desert 
it. Mainstream users receive a product of reasonably good quality while not having to 
incur selection costs. The mainstream user segment could therefore work efficiently, even 
if it were dominated by one producer. This model has worked on the browser market, 
after the Consent Decree, where Microsoft Internet Explorer is kept in check by Firefox, 
Opera, Safari and others. Under this line of analysis, integration delivers its benefits to 
the mainstream users who value it, while the tech-savvy users obtain the best product that 
they are seeking. The main role for competition authorities is to keep the tech-savvy 
segment open, which the US authorities did with the Consent Decree by ensuring that the 
tying can be defeated or reversed. The remedy advocated by the Commission in 
Microsoft, in contrast, is of limited use, if any. 
 
In strict legal terms, the CFI was not bound to take into account how the market evolved 
after the Commission Decision. It is conducting judicial review, in order to control 
whether the Commission Decision was legal when it was taken, and not whether it turned 
out to have been correct in retrospect.
101 At the same time, given the high stakes in 
Microsoft and the skill of the CFI, it is surprising that the CFI would not somehow allow 
its reasoning to be influenced by how reality did unfold, at least as far as the interplay 
between the EC and US remedies was concerned. 
 
On a positive note, the CFI supports the decision of the Commission to treat the 
foreclosure of competition as a separate condition which must be investigated on its 
own.
102 Microsoft opportunistically argued that this marked a departure from previous 
case-law, where the very tying was deemed to have a foreclosure effect by nature.
103 The 
CFI rejects that argument, although unfortunately it stops just shy of ruling that 
foreclosure of competition must always be established separately.
104  
 
3.4.  Absence of objective justification 
 
Finally, much like on the interoperability issue, the discussion of the efficiency defence 
brought forward by Microsoft as an objective justification for the tying illustrates the 
                                                 
101 Ibid. at para. 963 and 260. 
102 Ibid. at para. 867-868, 1031-1035. 
103 Of course, as a general proposition, Microsoft – like any other defendant in an Article 82 EC case – is 
served by an autonomous foreclosure requirement, but as noted, supra, note 71, this argument is brought 
forward in a litigation context. 
104 On this point, Ahlborn and Evans’ criticism of the CFI at {14-15} is unduly harsh. The CFI does take a 
step in the right direction, and provided that one agrees with the Commission’s focus on the OEM 
distribution channel (which neither Ahlborn and Evans nor this author do), the part of the Commission case 
which the CFI considers sufficient does indeed support a finding of foreclosure.    20 
weakness of the Commission approach to efficiencies under Article 82 EC. Putting 
efficiencies at the tail-end of the examination makes the defence practically pointless. 
Indeed the CFI promptly sides with the Commission in rejecting Microsoft’s arguments, 
mostly because the Commission remedy does not forbid the bundled Windows and 
therefore does not take away the efficiencies arising from the integration of WMP into 
Windows. 
 
3.5.  Conclusion on tying 
 
In the end, even though the substantive analysis of the Commission on tying is generally 
sound, one is left wondering why the Commission chose to pursue the tying case further 
after the US Consent Decree entered into force in 2002. On a proper assessment of the 
competitive situation, the Consent Decree addressed the concerns which arose from 
tying, by ensuring that end-users could still break the tie and switch to other products. If 
the Consent Decree was not an adequate remedy because it was limited in duration, the 
Commission could have adopted it and made it permanent.
105 Instead, the Commission 
chose to narrow its focus to the OEM channel and insisted on the creation of a Windows 
version without WMP (Windows XP N). That product was doomed from the start, being 
placed on the market alongside the bundled version and sold for the same price.  
 
Indeed, in light of the preceding discussion, the tying case cannot be just about Windows 
OS and WMP and competition on the market for media players. To a large extent, the 
Consent Decree addressed these issues. The Commission case is also about who gets to 
makes fundamental decisions such as the bundling decision.
106 The Commission is 
concerned generally with the control of innovation paths and intended Microsoft to break 
new ground in this respect.
107 When dealing with foreclosure of competition, the 
Commission analyzed how Microsoft could use the position of WMP on the media player 
market to create network effects in favour of its proprietary encoding formats.
108 This 
could then eventually spill over to other markets (distribution of content over other 
devices than computers, digital rights management (DRM) systems, etc.).
109 The CFI 
                                                 
105 As discussed in P. Larouche, “Legal issues concerning remedies in network industries”, in D. Geradin, 
ed., Remedies in network industries: EC competition law vs. sector-specific regulation (Antwerp: 
Intersentia, 2004) 21 at 39-41, however, experience shows that competition and regulatory authorities, once 
they have invested in an investigation, will not readily conclude that the actions of another authority have 
already addressed the issues which arise from the investigation. 
106 The IT industry has always been very critical of Microsoft’s single-handed decisions as to which 
features or applications would be integrated into Windows, since these decisions often terminated or shrunk 
entire lines of business. Of course, this can be an efficient outcome but the issue remains whether Microsoft 
is best qualified to make that decision. 
107 That concern is also present in the first part of the case dealing with interoperability information, but in a 
more subdued fashion: see Judgment at para. 392. 
108 The reasoning of the Commission assumes that the dissemination of content will take place along the 
lines of a broadcasting model, where a small number of large content providers and software developers 
decide for the larger group of passive users. In such a situation, it might indeed pay off to stick to 
proprietary standards for encoding. However, so far content dissemination on the Internet is also largely 
done via non-broadcasting models, in particular via decentralized peer-to-peer. In such a case, a proprietary 
approach to encoding might be unsuccessful, given the large number of smaller content providers. 
109 Decision at para. 879-897.   21 
endorsed that analysis, but it considered that it was not essential for the case.
110 When 
Microsoft argued that these network effects actually made the tying of Windows OS and 
WMP efficient by providing content providers and software developers with an 
ubiquitous integrated platform, the Commission answered that: “an undistorted 
competition process constitutes a value in itself as it generates efficiencies and creates a 
climate conducive to innovation (innovation being, in markets such as the software 
market, a key competition parameter)”.
111 The CFI went even further, holding that:
112 
Although, generally, standardisation may effectively present certain advantages, it 
cannot be allowed to be imposed unilaterally by an undertaking in a dominant 
position by means of tying... [I]t cannot be ruled out that third parties will not 
want the de facto standardisation advocated by Microsoft but will prefer it if 
different platforms continue to compete, on the ground that that will stimulate 
innovation between the various platforms. 
As with other issues discussed earlier, neither the Commission nor the CFI takes its 
reasoning to the end. If unilateral standardization by a dominant player is not acceptable, 
then what is the preferred option? The CFI states that competition between platforms 
might also be desirable for some, without more. Microsoft calls for further research on 
the link between competition policy, innovation policy and standardization. 
 
4.  Conclusion and outlook 
 
In Microsoft, the CFI tells us the story of a large, successful and innovative firm by all 
accounts, that could not however resist the temptation to exploit the opportunities created 
along the innovation path to take extra jabs at the competition. At the same time, the 
second part of Microsoft contains another narrative as well, that of the Commission as 
policy entrepreneur that could not resist the temptation to intervene either, even as its 
concerns had been by and large addressed. The CFI failed to pick up that second story. 
 
On interoperability, the case is presented by the CFI as a mere application of the IMS test. 
Whether other conditions exist besides those of the IMS test will have to be settled on 
another day. The CFI gives undue significance and autonomy to the IMS test, which 
ultimately is but a set of proxies.
113 As a matter of law, it ignores other equally useful 
proxies which the Commission had put forward in its Decision, namely the previous 
course of dealings and the superdominant position of Microsoft. 
 
On tying, the test used by the Commission is found to be in line with the existing case-
law (Hilti and Tetra Pak II), but here as well, the CFI avoids to rule on the thornier issue 
of whether foreclosure must be proven separately as an autonomous condition of the 
tying test. That will also have to wait for another case. Perhaps the biggest 
disappointment in the whole case is that the CFI does not seem willing or able to rein in 
the Commission when, after a reasonably sound case in substance, it ignored the effect of 
                                                 
110 Judgment at para. 1060-1077. 
111 Decision at para. 969. 
112 Judgment at para. 1152-1153. 
113 In my view, in contrast to Ahlborn and Evans, the sanctification of the IMS test is a greater concern that 
any loosening of the set of exceptional circumstances.   22 
the Consent Decree and went on to order an outlandish remedy, the creation of Windows 
XP N. 
 
Not only is the CFI judgment in Microsoft long and difficult to digest in its entirety, but it 
is structured in such a way that the “official” legal discussion is limited in scope and 
relatively uncontroversial. Accordingly, its precedential value could remain limited. This 
would turn Microsoft into a very complex but ultimately unique case, contrary to what 
the Commission intended at the time it took its decision.
114 In that sense, while the 
Commission won its case in front of the CFI, it did not obtain the resounding 
endorsement it was hoping for. The CFI did not settle the law, and the issues raised in 
Microsoft will end up before the CFI again. 
 
Indeed whether Microsoft will have a larger impact – as Ahlborn and Evans fear
115 – 
depends on the extent to which, in subsequent cases, various key points hidden in the 
discussion of the reasoning of the Commission are extricated from their context and 
turned into general legal propositions. In the part on interoperability information, for one, 
the Commission and the CFI implicitly prefer competition in the market and incremental 
innovation over competition for the market and breakthrough innovation, as reflected in 
the discussion of the indispensability and new product circumstances. Unfortunately, this 
choice remains implicit; perhaps it is linked with the super-dominance of Microsoft, as 
some passages would seem to indicate, in which case the issue will remain open in 
subsequent cases where the defendant is not super-dominant. In the part on tying, both 
the Commission and the CFI briefly glimpse into the links between competition policy, 
innovation and standardization, raising more questions than they answer. Here as well, 
the discussion takes place against the background of super-dominance, so that it might be 
confined to the facts of Microsoft.  
 
So far, the main impact of Microsoft is psychological. After a string of defeats,
116 the 
Commission managed to win what was perhaps its most important case ever, the one on 
which it had staked its credibility. Its confidence boosted, the Commission is now 





120 Two new cases have also been 
                                                 
114 See among others the statements made by then Commissioner Monti on the eve of the decision: 
“Commissioner Monti' s statement on Microsoft”, Press Release IP/04/365 (18 March 2004), available on 
europa.eu/rapid. The Commissioner was hoping for “a strong precedent” to “establish clear principles for 
the future conduct of a company with such a strong dominant position in the market”. 
115 Ahlborn and Evans at {27} and ff. 
116 In merger control cases, the Commission lost the infamous “2002 trilogy”: CFI, 6 June 2002, Case T-
342/99, Airtours v. Commission [2002] ECR II-2585; 22 October 2002, Case T-310/01, Schneider Electric 
v. Commission [2002] ECR II-4071; 25 October 2002, Case T-5/02, Tetra Laval v. Commission [2002] 
ECR II-4381 (confirmed by ECJ, supra, note 5). It also lost for all intents and purposes in General Electric, 
supra, note 25. 
117 “Commission confirms sending of statement of objections to Intel”, MEMO/07/314 (27 July 2007). Intel 
is suspected of abusive conduct designed to exclude its rival AMD from the market. 
118 “Commission confirms sending a statement of objections to Rambus”, MEMO/07/330 (23 August 
2007). Rambus is suspected of ‘patent ambush’ in the Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) market. 
119 “Commission confirms sending a statement of objections against alleged territorial restrictions in on-line 
music sales to major record companies and Apple”, MEMO/07/126 (3 April 2007). This case concerns the   23 
opened against Microsoft.
121 At the same time, the Commission does not have additional 
resources, so it cannot handle so many such cases at once.
122 On the international scene, 
Microsoft has been criticized as yet another instance of excessive interventionism by the 
European Commission, but at the same time in certain quarters the Commission has also 
been applauded as the only major competition authority which actually dares to tackle 
difficult cases and large defendants.
123 Happily or not, Microsoft could herald a passing 
of the torch to the European Commission as the leading competition policy enforcer, at 
least in the high-tech sector. 
 
At the policy level, Microsoft lays out bare the shortcomings of the approach proposed by 
the Commission in the Discussion Paper
124 for the inclusion of an efficiency defence in 
Article 82 EC analysis. In both parts of the case, the split between the assessment of 
abuse (in particular of the anti-competitive effect of the allegedly abusive conduct) and 
the efficiency defence is hard to follow at a conceptual level, and in practice it makes the 
efficiency defence a hopeless exercise, coming as it does at the tail-end of the analysis. 
 
Ahlborn and Evans consider that Microsoft follows an outdated ordoliberal approach.
125 
Such sweeping criticism is exaggerated. Contrary to what Ahlborn and Evans claim, 
Microsoft marks a significant improvement in the quality of the competition analysis, 
away from the hallmarks of ordoliberalism – a form-based approach, the special 
responsibility of the dominant firm
126 – and towards a more effects-based approach. In 
both parts of the case, the Commission carefully set out how the conduct of Microsoft in 
its view harmed competition and ultimately consumers; as set out above, the CFI could 
have endorsed this evolution more strongly.  
                                                                                                                                                 
restrictions imposed on iTunes users (via credit card controls) preventing them from purchasing in iTunes 
stores outside the Member State where their credit card was issued, leading to differentials in price and 
choice between Member States. Contrary to the other cases mentioned here, this case is based on Article 81 
EC, relying as it does on the distribution agreements between Apple and major record companies. It was 
settled when Apple agreed to equalize iTunes prices: “Commission welcomes Apple’s announcement to 
equalise prices for music downloads from iTunes in Europe”, IP/08/22 (9 January 2008). Apple has also 
been involved in competition litigation at Member State level, concerning the restrictions on playing iTunes 
tracks on other MP3 players than the iPod (France and the Netherlands, complaint rejected) or the exclusive 
distribution agreements for the iPhone (Germany, interim measures against Apple refused on appeal). 
120 “Commission initiates formal proceedings against Qualcomm”, MEMO/07/389 (1 October 2007). 
Qualcomm allegedly breached Article 82 EC when licensing its intellectual property on exploitative terms. 
121 “Commission initiates formal investigations against Microsoft in two cases of suspected abuse of 
dominant market position”, MEMO/08/19 (14 January 2008). These revisit the two issues in Microsoft, 
albeit on new markets, namely the release of interoperability information regarding Microsoft Office and 
the tying of Internet Explorer to Windows so as to defeat open standards. These two new cases have 
allegedly caused Microsoft to espouse a different approach and issue its Interoperability Principles on 21 
February 2008: http://www.microsoft.com/interop/principles/default.mspx.  
122 All the more since the CFI did quash the Commission Decision as far as the use of the monitoring 
trustee was concerned (Judgment at para. 1261 and ff.),, implying that more Commission resources will 
need to be dedicated to the implementation of decisions than was the case in Microsoft. 
123 The latter is not entirely accurate, since the US Department of Justice did succeed at least in part in its 
case against Microsoft: United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C.Cir.2001) (en banc ). 
124 Supra, note 61. 
125 Ahlborn and Evans at {17-20}. 
126 The notion of special responsibility is only mentioned once in the reasoning of the CFI (at para. 229), in 
a quite inconsequential manner.   24 
 
The evidence of ordoliberalism brought forward by Ahlborn and Evans is not convincing. 
For one, while the CFI lapses into “competition on the merits” language at times, by and 
large the improvements in interoperability in Windows 2000 and the efficiencies arising 
from bundling Windows OS and WMP are recognized as legitimate achievements from 
which Microsoft is not to be deprived. It is the additional steps of refusing to disclose 
interoperability information or not enabling customers to separate Windows OS from 
WMP which give rise to problems. 
 
If anything, what Ahlborn and Evans criticize as the use of form-based analysis and 
structural presumptions, allegedly leading to a shift in emphasis on static competition, 
could be more constructively interpreted as a divergence of views on dynamic 
effeciencies and innovation. Ahlborn and Evans take a somewhat offhand view: as long 
as firms – including larger ones – are incentivized, innovation will ensue and bring about 
measurable static benefits in the form of efficiencies (better interoperability, integration 
of media functionality, etc.). Dynamic aspects, since they cannot be measured, are better 
left alone. The Commission and the CFI take a different and equally coherent view, but 
unfortunately they leave it unarticulated. As indicated above, Microsoft rests on an 
implicit preference for incremental over breakthrough innovation – at least when 
superdominance is involved – and a concern for the control over innovation paths. The 
Commission intervenes to protect the competitive process not for the sake of keeping 
competitors in business, but rather in order to ensure that innovation continues to be 
generated outside of the superdominant firm (or at least that incentives remain for 
competitors to try to innovate). By the same token, consumer preferences – the decisive 
factor in rewarding innovation –– are expressed directly through the competitive process 
as opposed to the unilateral decision of a firm based on its perception of these 
preferences.  
 
It is by no means clear that the view of the Commission and the CFI is preferrable; it has 
its advantages and disadvantages, which need to be further researched and which will 
hopefully be better understood and explained in future cases. However, that view cannot 
be summarily branded with the ‘stigma’ of ordoliberalism. 
 